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JOINT VENTURES AND ANTITRUST POLICY
NATURE AND USE OF JOINT VENTURES
The corporate joint venture is a business entity created and
owned by two or more corporate partners who desire to engage
jointly in a business activity in which they have common interests.1
Joint ventures were used by the railroads in the 1880's2 and success-
fully employed in industry before World War 11.3 Since World War
II the joint venture has experienced its greatest growth in popu-
larity; 4 a growth marked by a commensurate increase in the Gov-
ernment's interest in this form of business association.- The Govern-
ment's interest recently culminated in the Supreme Court's holding
in United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co.' that section 7 of the
Clayton Act applies to joint ventures.
Since joint ventures can serve many purposes in the production
process, it is convenient to classify them according to function as
vertical, horizontal, or conglomerate joint ventures. In a vertical
orientation, the joint venture may operate in research; may serve as
a source of raw materials, a producer of a component part, a fabri-
cator, or a distributor. 7 The backward-vertical venture is used as a
1 The corporate joint venture will be referred to throughout this paper simply
as "joint venture." The joint venture is also known as the "jointly-owned subsidiary,"
the "fifty-fifty corporation," the "business co-operative," and the "corporate partner-
ship." See Dixon, "Joint Ventures: What is their Impact on Competition?" 7 Anti-
trust Bull. 397 (1962).
2 Dixon, supra note 1, at 398.
3 Handler, "Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity, Diversification and Joint
Ventures," 49 Va. L. Rev. 433, 441 (1963).
4 In 1957, the 1,000 largest corporations in the United States had formed approxi-
mately 345 joint ventures which operated at various levels of the production process.
Martini & Berman, "Expansion Via Joint Subsidiaries," in American Management
Association, Mergers and Acquisitions 83 (1957). In 1961, seventy joint ventures
were formed in the United States and Canada. Handler, supra note 3, at 441.
G The F.T.C. has sent questionnaires to the 1,000 largest corporations in an at-
tempt to discover which corporations are involved in joint ventures, how many are
so involved, and what effect the joint venture has had on the American economy.
Dixon, supra note 1, at 409.
6 378 U.S. 158 (1964). For discussion of Penn-Olin, see text accompanying notes
49-70 infra.
7 Eaton, "Joint Ventures," in How to Comply with the Antitrust Laws 245
(Van Cise & Dunn ed. 1954).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
source of supply in the production of raw materials." Forward inte-
gration, another form of the vertical arrangement, functions in mar-
keting and product distribution and is probably most common in
the oil industry, where joint ventures are formed by producers to
operate pipelinesY A horizontal joint venture involves identical pro-
cessing of the same product or item as either or both of the parent
corporations.' 0 Generally the horizontal venture is employed to ex-
ploit new geographic markets. 1 The conglomerate joint venture
engages in a line of commerce distinct from the line currently occu-
pied by its parents.- 2 Diversification is thereby accomplished not
by the traditional techniques of internal expansion or merger, but
by creation of a jointly-owned corporation.
In an address to the Economic Club of Detroit, Paul R. Dixon,
Chairman of the FTC, outlined four basic reasons why joint ventures
are formed: (1) to spread the risk of new industrial developments,
(2) to accumulate large amounts of capital, (3) to establish one
joint facility for greater economy, and (4) to undertake programs
too vast for individual companies to handle. 13 Another advantage
of joint ventures is that they facilitate sharing technological knowl-
edge, managerial skills, and experience in production and marketing.
8 An example is the Erie Mining Co., a $350,000,000 creation of four steel pro-
ducers, designed to obtain iron ore from taconite, a low-grade ore-bearing material.
Handler, suepra note 3, at 441.
9 In the oil industry such arrangements are the rule, not the exception. For
example, the Sun Oil Co. joined with Standard Oil of Ohio to build a twenty-two
inch pipeline from Longview, Texas, to Lima, Ohio. With its own capital, Sun could
have built only a twelve inch pipeline. The large pipeline saved Sun one-half the
shipping cost that it would have incurred with the smaller line. A.B.A. Section of
Antitrust Law, Two Panel Discussions: New Frontiers in Section 7 Enforcement
and Joint Ventures and the Sherman Act 32 (1963) (remarks of Mr. Freund);
Handler, supra note 3, at 442 n.31.
10 Tractenberg, "Joint Ventures on the Domestic Front: A Study in Uncertainty,"
8 Antitrust Bull. 797, 798 (1963). An example of a horizontal joint venture can be
found in United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), rev'd, 371 U.S. 296 (1963), where Pan American and W. R. Grace Co. formed
Panagra Airlines to operate along the west coast of Central America. For discussion
of this case see text accompanying notes 41-44 infra.
11 Such horizontal mergers are classified by the Federal Trade Commission as
"market-extension" mergers. Day, "Conglomerate Mergers and 'The Curse of Big-
ness,'" 42 N.C.L. Rev. 511, 518 (1964). See generally Comment, "The Corporate
Joint Venture Under the Antitrust Laws," 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 712 (1962).
12 Current examples of conglomerate joint ventures are Astrodyne, Inc., and
Goodrich-Gulf Chemicals, Inc. The former corporation was formed when Phillips
Petroleum pooled its knowledge of solid propellants with North American Aviation's
techniques in missiles to produce rocket fuel. Goodrich Rubber and Gulf Oil formed
Goodrich-Gulf Chemicals to develop an improved petroleum-based synthetic rubber.
See A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Law, op. cit. supra note 9, at 32.
13 Dixon, supra note 1, at 399.
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Moreover, joint ventures may further increase profit from invest-
ment and development of foreign markets; and they may serve to
prevent local dissatisfaction with absentee control of a business
operation, particularly in foreign markets.14 There are several ob-
vious disadvantages to joint ventures: The most significant is, of
course, the ever-present danger of antitrust law infringement. Other
problems can occur within the partner-corporations, for example, in
harmonizing business philosophies and long-range objectives, formu-
lating business policy, and reducing day-to-day internal friction
caused by common management by the partners. 5
While the economic advantages and associational disadvantages
are evident, the primary problem confronting both business and the
Government is to determine when joint ventures cease to be eco-
nomically justifiable. One commentator" believes that the primary
motive in forming joint ventures is to avoid competition, and that
any alleged technical or economic motive is but a subterfuge in most
cases to achieve this end. This tendency of joint ventures to lessen
competition and the efficacy of decisions like Penn-Olin- in limiting
it provides the focus of this comment.
THE LEGALITY OF JOINT VENTURES UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Effect on Competition
Joint ventures have obvious direct and indirect effects on com-
petition. The very existence of the joint venture provides a common
meeting place for the officers and directors of otherwise separate
corporations, thus creating a potential forum for illegal collusionY
Also, due to the existence of common management, joint ventures
foster networks of interlocking directorates" which can lead to
collusive agreements such as reciprocal trading arrangements con-
14 Boyle, "The Joint Subsidiary: An Economic Appraisal," 5 Antitrust Bull.
303 (1960); Handler, "Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity, Diversification and
Joint Ventures," 49 Va. L. Rev. 433 (1963); Tractenberg, "Joint Ventures on the
Domestic Front: A Study in Uncertainty," 8 Antitrust Bull. 797 (1963).
15 Tractenberg, supra note 14, at 807-08.
16 Berghoff, "Antitrust Aspects of Joint Ventures," 9 Antitrust Bull. 231 (1964).
17 The common meeting place may be considered as weighing on the probability
of illegal behavior. In Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563
(1925), it was held not to be illegal per se. See generally Berghoff, supra note 16, at
236; Boyle, supra note 14; Hale, "Joint Ventures: Collaborative Subsidiaries and the
Antitrust Laws," 42 Va. L. Rev. 927 (1956).
18 The Government is increasing its attack on illegal interlocking directorates,
which are subject to the provisions of § 8 of the Clayton Act. For example, the FTC
has installed an electronic computer to be used to trace interlocking directorates. See
Day, "Developments in Antitrust During the Past Year," 25 A.B.A. Section of
Antitrust Law 3, 90 (1964).
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cerning other products. 19 Another overall effect of joint ventures is
their tendency to create concentrations of economic wealth.2 The
competitive advantage dependent upon deep pockets gained through
merger has been subject to close scrutiny by the Government,21 and
the pocket gained through the joint venture is potentially as deep.
In the case of vertical joint ventures, competition is naturally
foreclosed to other companies who ordinarily would serve as the
suppliers or marketing agents of the partners.2 2 Where conglomerate
and horizontal joint ventures are created, competition can be ef-
fected in several ways. First, it is likely that competition will be
restrained between the parents and the joint venture to protect the
markets available to the joint venture. Secondly, the parents will
certainly curb the natural business growth of the joint venture to
avoid overlap into their own markets.23 Further, competition be-
tween the parents themselves may be lessened. For example, where
the parents jointly expand their common product into a new geo-
graphic market or where the parents jointly enter a new industry, it
is possible that the partners have, in effect, agreed not to compete
with each other by creating a division of territories. 4
It appears that joint ventures effect competition in much the
same manner as do mergers, and for this reason they are often re-
ferred to as quasi-mergers. 25 Although joint ventures may sub-
stantially effect actual competition, they are more likely to effect
potential competition 26 than are mergers. However, since the part-
ner-corporations are adding a new comptitor to the market place in-
stead of eliminating an old one, the joint venture on its face would
appear more capable of enhancing competition than are mergers.
More precisely, there appear to be situations where joint ventures
are justified, for example, in cases of small parent companies engag-
ing in or attempting to enter highly concentrated markets, or in
cases where the purpose of the joint venture is to pioneer a new
field, explore new resources and markets, or increase business effi-
ciency for the ultimate benefit of the public.
2 7
19 Reciprocal trading has also attracted the attention of the Government. See
Hausman, "Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws," 77 Harv. L. Rev. 873 (1964).
20 Berghoff, supra note 16, at 235.
2 1 See Day, supra note 11, at 539.
22 For discussion of the foreclosure theory, see Hale, supra note 17.
23 Brewster, Antitrust and American Business Abroad 202 (1958).
24 Tractenberg, "Joint Ventures on the Domestic Front: A Study in Uncer-
tainty," 8 Antitrust Bull. 797 (1963).
25 Kaysen & Turner, Antitrust Policy 136 (1959).
26 For discussion of the doctrine of potential competition see text accompanying
notes 73-97 infra.
27 A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Law, op. cit. supra note 9, at 31-33; Hale, supra
note 17.
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Given the joint ventures' obvious potential for deleterious direct
and indirect impact on competition, both real and emergent, and
its equally clear potential for providing a flexible form of organiza-
tion capable of creating competition, the Government is confronted
with the perplexing problem of when and how to attack the legality
of joint ventures under the existing antitrust laws. Consequently,
the Government's use of the Sherman Act and, more recently, sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act has been attended by conflicting theories
of purpose and statutory application.
The Sherman Act
The relatively early cases in which joint ventures were found
illegal involved situations where the joint venture was clearly used
to produce anticompetitive results. While using the label "joint
venture," the business associations usually involved other factors
which in themselves were antitrust violations. Timken Roller Bear-
ing Co. v. United States28 involved a network of pricing agreements
and territorial allocations among Timken, a third party, and their
jointly-owned British and French subsidiaries. The Supreme Court
held that the purpose of the agreement was to avoid competition
and that such agreements could not "be justified by labeling the
project a 'joint venture.' "29 In United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc.,30 the Court struck down the joint ownership of movie
theaters by motion picture distributors and exhibitors. The facts
showed monopolistic and conspiratorial conduct by the owners in
restricting distribution of their films to theaters of their choice. The
Court ignored the form of the arrangement, examining only its sub-
stance. United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co." involved
an arrangement whereby major abrasive manufacturers in the
United States agreed to establish joint manufacturing companies in
certain foreign countries. Each joint owner agreed not to compete
with the joint ventures in each foreign country.32 In striking down
the arrangement Judge Wyzanski indicated that such associations
are illegal per se by stating in dictum that "joint foreign factories
like joint domestic price-fixing would be invalid per se because they
eliminate or restrain competition in the American domestic mar-
28 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
2, Id. at 598.
30 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
31 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
32 By this agreement to restrict business in the foreign countries to the jointly
owned firms, 80% of the United States export trade in the abrasives industry was cut
off. The only justification presented by the defendants was that they could make
higher profits by selling through foreign subsidiaries. See Tractenberg, supra note 10,
at 801.
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ket".33 Although joint ventures were employed in the above cases,
the courts avoided direct confrontation with the question of their
legality, thereby leaving few guidelines for courts to consider when
that question was later raised. From these cases have emerged two
conflicting theories of illegality: the per se rule and the rule of
reason.
While the per se rule generally has been rejected, it is theoreti-
cally tenable, because virtually all joint ventures result in an avoid-
ance of competition, actual or potential.3 4 Since vertical joint
ventures invariably foreclose some competition, 3  and the very
existence of the conglomerate and horizontal joint venture implies at
least a limited agreement not to compete,36 strict application of the
antitrust ethic would effectively eliminate virtually all joint ven-
tures. Another factor tending to support a per se rule is that every
joint venture involves price fixing and territorial allocation among
the parents and the venture. These agreements would be collusive,
conspiratorial per se violations of the Sherman Act should the Gov-
ernment disregard the separate corporate entity of the joint
venture.
3 7
Despite this theoretical viability, the per se rule has not been
accepted because it does not consider the economic and business
realities which often justify the presence of joint ventures in the
economy. The result has been a general acceptance of the rule of
reason-a test which balances the economic justification for the
joint venture against its actual or potential effect on competition. 8
The rule of reason renders illegal any joint venture creating un-
reasonable restraints on trade. Generally, the cases have appeared
33 92 F. Supp. at 963.
34 Boyle, supra note 14, at 307; Hale, supra note 17, at 931; Tractenberg, supra
note 10, at 811.
35 Strict application of the foreclosure test as applied in United States v.
National City Lines, Inc., 186 F2d 562 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 916 (1951),
would invalidate all joint ventures. See Hale, supra note 17, at 931. The soundness
of this argument is doubtful in view of the prevailing notion that vertical arrangements
are not inherently bad. See Hale, supra at 933-34. For further discussion of vertical
integration see Singer, "Vertical Integration and Economic Growth," 50 A.B.AJ.
555 (1964).
36 It is arguable that the first joint venture cases were premised on the agree-
ment-not-to-compete concept, thus rendering joint ventures illegal per se. See Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, supra note 28; United States v. Imperial Chem.
Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); United States v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., supra note 31; Hale, supra note 17, at 933.
37 Berghoff, supra note 16, at 233.
38 Brewster, op. cit. supra note 23, at 206, says: "The legality of joint ventures
will depend on the purpose and nature of the enterprise, the situation of the partners,
and their place in the market. In short, we assume that illegality turns on unreason-
ableness and is well outside the area of per se violations."
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to support the rule of reason. In United States v. Imperial Chem.
Indus.,3 the court, although striking down a joint venture, stated
that "joint manufacturing ventures, even in domestic markets, are
not made unlawful per se by the Sherman Act but become unlawful
only if their purpose or effect is to restrain trade or to monopo-
lize." 40 Moreover, the Supreme Court in Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc. v. United States41 by-passed an opportunity to hold joint ven-
tures illegal per se. In that case Pan American and W. R. Grace
formed a joint venture, Panagra Airlines, to operate along the west-
ern coast of Central and South America. Panagra then attempted
to expand its authorized routes northward, which would have
brought it into competition with its parent, Pan American. Pan
American attempted to block this extension. A district court held
that the creation of the joint venture and the territorial agreements
between the venture and its parents were neither unreasonable re-
straints of trade nor per se antitrust violations; 4 however, the court
held that Pan American's attempt to block Panagra's natural busi-
ness expansion violated section 2 of the Sherman Act.43 The Supreme
Court did not disturb the reasoning of the district court on the
antitrust matters, but reversed on jurisdictional grounds. 44
Since it is evident that the courts will not follow a per se rule
in applying the Sherman Act,43 it is crucial to determine what factors
the courts will deem relevant in attempting to find a particular joint
venture an unreasonable restraint of trade. Some of the factors that
the courts may consider are the size of the parent corporations, the
relative size of the joint venture, the degree of competition existing
in the relevant market, the size of the market entered, the relation
of the parties to each other (i.e., whether competitors or not), the
function of the joint venture in relation to its parents, the degree of
managerial control of the new entity by the parents, the nature of
the product involved, the relative ease or difficulty in entering that
market individually, the relative amount of competition foreclosed,
the motives of the parties in creating the new entity, and the history
of the venture's evolution.46
39 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
40 Id. at 557; cf. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1958).
41 371 U.S. 296 (1963), reversing 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
42 United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18, 32-36
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
43 Id. at 36.
44 371 U.S. 296 (1963), reversing 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The Court
reversed on the ground that the decisions made by the district court were for the CAB.
45 It has been observed that the Government's attitude has been not to push for a
per se rule, see Brewster, op. cit. supra note 23, at 210; indeed, such an effort would
be totally inconsistent with the Government's willingness to permit joint ventures under
some circumstances by modifying consent decrees, Berghoff, supra note 16, at 234 & n.8.
46 See A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Law, op. cit. supra note 9, at 30 (remarks of
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From these factors and applicable economic data, the courts
must decide whether the agreement to form the joint venture or the
existence of the joint venture itself constitutes an agreement by the
parents not to compete or an illegal allocation of territories, or
whether the association in any other manner unreasonably restrains
trade. To sustain a violation of the Sherman Act, there must be a
finding that the parties intended to or did create an actual restraint
of trade.47 The test of illegality under the Sherman Act, therefore,
provides the joint venture with an opportunity to operate in the
market before its actual effects on competition can be determined,
unless the parents' agreements in relation to its creation can be
successfully attacked as conspiratorial under section 1.
Due to the strictness of the Government's burden of proof
under the Sherman Act and because joint ventures can result in the
same anticompetitive effects as mergers, it is not surprising that the
Government has sought to arrest illegal joint ventures in their in-
cipiency by invoking section 7, the anti-merger provision of the
Clayton Act.48
Section 7 of tke Clayton Act
In United States v. Penn-Olin Chkem. Co.,49 the first case to liti.
gate the question of the applicability of section 7 to joint ventures,
the Government was successful. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.
and Pennsalt Chemicals Co. jointly established Penn-Olin Chemical
Co. to produce and sell sodium chlorate in the Southeastern United
States market, with each corporation acquiring fifty per cent of the
new company's stock. Pennsalt produced sodium chlorate on the
west coast and was interested in expanding to the Southeastern
Mr. Ward) ; Berghoff, supra note 16, at 233; Boyle, supra note 14, at 308-09; Hale,
supra note 17; Tractenberg, supra note 14, at 811-12, 820-27; Comment, "The Corpo-
rate Joint Venture Under the Antitrust Laws," 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 712, 725, 730 (1962).
In remanding to the district court, the Supreme Court in Penn-Olin listed various
factors for the district court to consider in determining whether section 7 was violated.
378 U.S. 158, 177 (1964).
47 Sherman Act §§ 1, 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1958). But see
discussion of United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S.
665 (1964), infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
48 Clayton Act § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1958) states:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in com-
merce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly.
40 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
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market. Olin did not produce sodium chlorate but used it in the
production of other products.50 When Penn-Olin was formed, two
other companies accounted for about ninety per cent of the sodium
chlorate production in the Southeastern market.51 Although Olin
and Pennsalt were not competitors in sodium chlorate production,
they did compete in the production of other products.
The Government's complaint alleged that Olin and Pennsalt com-
peted with each other and that their acquisition of Penn-Olin stock
might substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in the production and sale of sodium chlorate in violation of sec-
tion 7. The complaint charged that the joint venture foreclosed
potential competition between Pennsalt and Olin Mathieson in the
production of sodium chlorate, that it substantially lessened actual
and potential competition between Olin and Pennsalt in the pro-
duction and sale of other chemicals, that it created a barrier to
entry into the market by other prospective competitors, that it
eliminated Olin Mathieson as a customer for sodium chlorate pro-
duced by Pennsalt's competitors, and that it encouraged other
competitors in the chemical and other industries to participate in
joint ventures as a means of avoiding and lessening competition.
The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the evi-
dence was insufficient to establish a violation of section 7. The court
evaded the question of the applicability of section 7.52
The Supreme Court remanded, holding that section 7 applies
to joint ventures.53 The Court stated that the district court erred
in finding that the evidence failed to show a reasonable probability
that both parents would have entered the Southeastern market but
for the joint venture: further, the lower court should have made a
finding as to the reasonable probability that one of the partners
would have entered the market.54 The Supreme Court said that to
50 The history of the formation of Penn-Olin is as follows: Pennsalt made in-
dependent studies of the Southeastern market beginning in 1951 with continuing
interest in the proposed expansion. In 1957 Pennsalt decided to explore the possibilities
of joint entry with Olin, who had also been studying the prospects of building a
plant in the southeastern market. In 1957 the two corporations decided to test the
market by an agreement which established Olin as the selling agent of Pennsalt for
sodium chlorate in the market. The parties agreed to keep each other informed of
their intentions regarding independent expansion and of business conditions in the
relevant market. The parties then negotiated to form a joint venture which was
organized on February 25, 1960.
51 Hooker Chemical Corp. and American Potash and Chemical Corp. held about
90% of the market share of the Southeastern sodium chlorate industry, and Pennsalt
held the rest. The industry had expanded rapidly since the early 1950's. Another
corporation, Pittsburgh Glass, had recently entered the relevant market.
52 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963).
53 378 U.S. at 167-68.
54 378 U.S. at 175-76.
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determine whether a joint venture might substantially lessen compe-
tition one must consider whether both parent companies would
probably have entered the market, whether one would probably
have entered alone, and also whether the joint venture eliminated
the potential competition of a company that might have stayed at
the edge of the market, threatening to enter.f5
In its desire to advance the prevailing national antitrust policy,
the Court faced an initial conceptual problem in applying a merger
statute to joint ventures: Mergers result in the removal of a compe-
titive entity from the market, but the joint venture creates a new
competitor. 6 This crucial distinction would be ignored by treating
every joint venture as a merger. The Court in Penn-Olin recognized
the conceptual differences between mergers and joint ventures by
stating that while joint ventures can result in the same anticompeti-
tive effects as mergers, different criteria may control? The Court,
however, predicated its decision on the applicability of section 7
upon the overall policy considerations behind the section.
58
Although the legislative history of section 7 does not indicate
that Congress specifically had joint ventures in mind at the time of
the 1950 amendments,59 the policy announced and promoted by
Congress demands the inclusion of joint ventures within the
section.60
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,"' one of the first merger cases
to be decided under section 7 as amended in 1950, discussed in detail
Congress' purpose in enacting the amendments. The Court stated
that:
the dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of the
1950 amendments was a fear of what was considered to be a rising
tide of economic concentration in the American economy ...
Other considerations cited in support of the bill were the de-
sirability of retaining "local control" over industry and the protec-
tion of small businesses.62
55 Id. at 174.
56 Morever, at least one commentator has noticed that the reasons for forming
joint ventures are often different from those which encourage mergers. Note, "Joint
Ventures and Section 7 of the Clayton Act," 14 Stan. L. Rev. 777, 796 (1962).
57 378 U.S. at 169-70.
58 Id. at 170-72.
59 Berghoff, supra note 16, at 244.
60 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United
States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Philadelpnhia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962).
61 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
62 Id. at 315-16. Cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F2d 416
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With this congressional policy in mind, the Court in Brown Shoe
gave a sweeping interpretation to amended section 7. The Court's
policy of liberal interpretation was carried forward in United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,63 where the Court concluded that the
purpose of the 1950 amendment was to strengthen the original sec-
tion 7 by broadening its scope to cover "the entire range of corpo-
rate amalgamations." 64 It is clear that joint ventures involving
large corporations may foster the very situation that the antitrust
laws attempt to prevent-economic concentration to the detriment
of small business. It is equally clear, then, that the Court in Penn-
Olin was again giving effect to the national policy behind the 1950
amendment by interpreting section 7 to include joint ventures.65
In addition to the conceptual problem in applying section 7 to
joint ventures, the Court in Penn-Olin was also confronted with a
language barrier. Section 7 applies only where the corporation whose
assets are being acquired is "engaged in commerce." '66 In the case of
joint ventures the assets of the new corporation are acquired at its
inception-when the new corporation is not engaged in commerce.6 7
The Court hurdled the language barrier easily.' First, the Court
looked to the substance and effect of the joint association. In this
vein the Court said that the obvious reduction in competition be-
tween the parents, coupled with the fact that Penn-Olin was organ-
ized to engage in commerce to further the business of its parents,
who were already in commerce, should bring it within the coverage
of section 7. Ultimately, the Court noted that Penn-Olin was en-
gaged in commerce long before the trial and applied the delayed-
timing rule announced in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours
c Co.69 This rule states that the economic effect of an acquisition
(2d Cir. 1945), in which Judge Hand wrote, "one of their [antitrust statutes'] pur-
poses was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an
organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other."
Id. at 429.
63 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
64 Id. at 342.
65 The Court in Penn-Olin stated: "Overall, the same considerations apply to
joint ventures as to mergers, for in each instance we are but expounding a national
policy enunciated by the Congress to preserve and promote a free competitive econ-
omy." 378 U.S. at 170.
66 See § 7 of the Clayton Act, quoted supra note 48.
67 This problem is discussed in Berghoff, "Antitrust Aspects of Joint Ventures,"
9 Antitrust Bull. 231, 242-45 (1964).
68 378 U.S. at 167-68.
69 353 U.S. 586 (1957). At least one notator suggests that the illegality of the
joint venture should be determined at the time of its creation rather than at the time
of trial in order to reduce the uncertainty confronting businessmen in trying to pre-
dict future injuries to competition. Note, 37 Colo. L. Rev. 135, 138 (1964).
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is to be measured at the time of trial, not at the time the acquisition
is made. Following this rule the Court concluded that Penn-Olin
was engaged in commerce within the meaning of section 7.70 In
overcoming the conceptual and technical difficulties in applying
section 7 to joint ventures, it is evident that the statute's policy
and purpose have been given great weight. By giving effect to over-
all policy considerations through liberal interpretation, the Court
has effectively plugged a potential loophole in the antitrust laws,
thus avoiding further legislative repairs.
Unlike the Sherman Act, which requires a finding of actual
injury to competition, section 7, designed to arrest threats to com-
petition in their incipiency, requires only a reasonable probability
that the acquisition will have anticompetitive effects.7 ' Actual re-
straints on competition need not be shown. Although the incipiency
theory does not require a finding of actual competitive injury, it
nevertheless involves complex economic determinations in finding
a "tendency" or "reasonable likelihood" of a substantial lessening
of competition. The Supreme Court has recognized this difficulty in
merger cases:
Clearly, this [whether the effect of the merger may be substan-
tially to lessen competition) is not the kind of question which is
susceptible of a ready and precise answer in most cases. It requires
not merely an appraisal of the immediate impact of the merger
upon competition, but a prediction of its impact upon competitive
conditions in the future; this is what is meant when it is said that
§ 7 was intended to arrest anticompetitive tendencies in their
"incipiency." . . . Such a prediction is sound only if it is based
upon a firm understanding of the structure of the relevant market;
yet the relevant economic data are both complex and elusive.72
The economic considerations would appear to be even more com-
plex and, as a result, a finding of a tendency to lessen competition
even more difficult to support in joint venture than in merger cases.
This is true because mergers tend to foreclose competition in the
present since the companies involved are currently engaged in com-
merce, whereas joint ventures at their creation tend to foreclose
only future competition. The economic data in joint venture cases
must therefore be projected into the future to determine the extent
of the lessening of potential competition. Because of the purpose of
section 7 to arrest anticompetitive tendencies in their incipiency
7 The Court also noted that the technicality could be avoided by filing an
amended complaint at the time of trial, but that this would be a useless formality. 378
U.S. at 168.
71 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 60, at 323; United States v. E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., supra note 69, at 592.
72 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963).
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and because of the nature of the joint venture as a new entity,
Penn-Olinr apparently is one of the first cases to rely solely upon
restrictions of potential competition as violative of an antitrust law.
Potential Competition
A recent Supreme Court decision, United States v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co.,73 is the first case relying solely on the concept of
potential competition.74 In that case, El Paso was the sole out-of-
state supplier of natural gas in California. Pacific Northwest Pipe-
line Corp. was a large corporation serving the Rocky Mountain
area. Pacific was interested in gaining a large contract to supply gas
to southern California, a contract which El Paso ultimately ob-
tained. Pacific continued to attempt to break into the California
market until negotiations between El Paso and Pacific resulted in
the acquisition of 99.8 per cent of Pacific's stock by El Paso. The
Government's merger suit under section 7 was sustained. The Court
held that although Pacific had not gained entry into the California
market, its effect as a potential supplier made it a substantial com-
petitive factor in that market. In discussing the potential compet-
itive importance of Pacific, Mr. Justice Douglas noted that the
California market was rapidly expanding and that, given the nature
of the market, Pacific's loss of the contract to El Paso did not elim-
inate it as an influential potential competitor because Pacific was
both willing and able to enter the market at the first opportunity. 75
Therefore the merger violated section 7 by eliminating this potential
competition.
In an attempt to establish some guidelines for future applica-
tion of the potential competition concept. Mr. Justice Douglas
stated:
The effect on competition in a particular market through acquisi-
tion of another company is determined by the nature or extent of
that market and by the nearness of the absorbed company to it,
that company's eagerness to enter that market, its resourcefulness,
and so on.76
73 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
74 However, it appears that potential competition was relied on in Aluminum
Co. of America v. FTC, 284 Fed. 401 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 616
(1923), which was decided under old § 7. In that case, Alcoa acquired a newly formed
company not yet engaged in business, and transferred to it the mill of a competitor.
The potential competition that had been eliminated was so close to actual competition
that the court quite properly treated potential competition as actual competition.
7G 376 U.S. at 659.
,( 376 U.S. at 658.
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It is significant that the Supreme Court was unanimous in its con-
clusion that potential competition alone was sufficient to sustain a
section 7 violation.7 7
Even though El Paso represents another instance of liberal
interpretation of section 7, the result is not surprising in view of the
history of the potential competition theory. Out of twenty-eight
merger cases filed from 1950 to 1958, twenty-three of them alleged
injury to potential competition, though none seemed to rest on that
theory alone. 78 For example, in United States v. Columbia Steel
Co.,79 a merger case under the Sherman Act, the Court agreed that
the probable restraint of potential competition might be considered
in weighing the effect of any acquisition of assets, but indicated that
the evidence of injury to potential competition in that case was
"highly speculative." 80 A district court in Transamerica Corp. v.
Board of Governors 81 recognized potential competition as an alter-
native theory, but held that the evidence failed to support it. These
cases seem to establish the permissibility of treating foreclosure of
potential competition as an antitrust violation; however, they also
indicate that relatively strong proof is required to sustain such
a theory.8 2
Use of the concept of potential competition by El Paso and
Penn-Olin required substituting potential competition for actual
competition. The term "potential competition" so used can be de-
fined as an existing positive competitive force supplied by the
immediate threat of new entry by an identified firm.83 The theory
is based on the economic reality that potential competition may
"keep power in check." 84 As the Court in Penn-Olin stated, "The
existence of an aggressive, well equipped and well financed corpora-
tion engaged in the same or related lines of commerce waiting
anxiously to enter an oligopolistic market would be a substantial
77 Mr. Justice Harlan, the lone dissenter, objected only to the Court's order of
divestiture without delay, preferring remand to the lower court to grant relief, as is
the customary practice. Mr. Justice Douglas' view in El Paso regarding the Supreme
Court's position in reversing, instead of remanding to the lower court for proper
relief, is consistent with his dissent in Penn-Olin, in which he would have reversed
and ordered divestiture. 378 U.S. at 182 (dissenting opinion).
78 Markham, "Merger Policy Under the New Section 7: A Six-year Appraisal,"
43 Va. L. Rev. 489, 519 (1957).
79 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
80 Id. at 528.
81 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
82 See Note, 11 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 393, 402 n.44 (1964).
83 See Rahl, "Applicability of the Clayton Act to Potential Competition," 12
A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Law Proceedings 128, 132 (1958).
84 Ibid.
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incentive to competition which cannot be underestimated." 85 Po-
tential competition may restrain producers from overcharging those
to whom they sell or from underpaying those from whom they buy,
but this potential competition, this continuing threat of market
entry, is lost when the potential entrant combines with other poten-
tial entrants or existing competitors and extrudes a single entrant.
It was felt that the Government in Penn-Olin was attempting
to establish a per se rule as to potential competition under section
7. In the district court, the Government appeared to argue that
where two parents could enter a market separately, the joint ven-
ture would be illegal."' Effectively such an interpretation would
have resulted in a per se rule because there are very few instances
where would-be venturers cannot obtain the necessary financing to
enter a market alone.87 The district court found no legal or logical
support for the Government's position:
[The Government] would substitute a conclusive presumption
that any combination specified in Section 7 between companies
having the overall capability to go into business alone has a per-
nicious effect on competition and lacks any redeeming virtue; it
would make any such combination illegal per se.88
Further, the possibility that a per se rule might eventuate seems to
have been disposed of by the Supreme Court in Penn-Olin and El
Paso, and by the district court in United States v. Crocker-Anglo
Nat'l Bank "I which stated that:
We think it is plain that before a merger may be condemned
merely because its effect may be to lessen potential competition it
must be ascertained that the potential competition is a reality,
that is to say, that there is a reasonable probability of such poten-
tial competition.9"
On the other hand, Mr. Justice Douglas appears to prefer a
per se rule based on the division-of-territories concept, which would
subject joint ventures to the Sherman Act.9 In his Penn-Olin dis-
sent, Mr. Justice Douglas wrote:
85 378 U.S. at 174.
86 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110, 130 (D. Del. 1963).
87 A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Law, Two Panel Discussions: New Frontiers in
Section 7 Enforcement and Joint Ventures and the Sherman Act 38 (1963) (remarks
of Mr. Freund).
88 217 F. Supp. at 124.
89 223 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
90 Id. at 855-56. (Emphasis added.)
91 Agreements to divide territories were held illegal under § 1 of the Sherman
Act in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Such agree-
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In principle the case is no different from one where Pennsalt
and Olin decide to divide the southeastern market as was done
in Addyston Pipe and in the other division-of-markets cases
already summarized. Through the "joint venture" they do indeed
divide it fifty-fifty. That division through the device of the "joint
venture" is as plain and precise as though made in more formal
agreements.9 2
However, those who advocate the application of the per se rule
to joint ventures are in the minority at the present and it is reason-
able to conclude that, until the Government can convince a major-
ity of the Supreme Court that the effect of all joint ventures is
presumptively anticompetitive, the Court will continue to reject
the per se rule and will demand complex economic investigation
and proof at trial.
Besides certainty in the law, a major concern of the per se
advocates is the desire to eliminate long trials and the attendant
voluminous records crammed with economic data.93 While the
Court may not quite be willing to sacrifice flexibility in favor of
certainty in antitrust law, it has indicated its willingness to accept
a prima facie test of illegality-at least in merger cases.9" Whether
or not the Court, having rejected a per se approach, adopts the
prima facie test in joint venture cases is immaterial to the quantity
and complexity of the evidence produced at trial, for such evidence
must be produced whether the Government is required to prove
its case or the defendants must rebut the presumption of illegality.
In dealing with injuries to potential competition the burden of
proof will be even more stringent than in the ordinary merger case.
Since the Clayton Act is designed to protect competition, and po-
tential competition is substituted for actual competition in joint
venture cases, there should be a requirement that the evidence
establish that the potential competition is substantial enough to
come under the statutory protection, i.e., that potential competition
is as potent as actual competition.95 The proof must establish (1)
that there was a reasonable probability that one or both of the
companies would have entered the relevant market but for the
ments are considered illegal per se. See Van Cise, "The Future of Per Se in Antitrust
Law," 50 Va. L. Rev. 1165, 1167 (1964). See generally Rifkind, "Division of Terri-
tories," in Hoffman's Antitrust Law and Techniques 49 (1963).
92 378 U.S. at 180 (dissenting opinion). This division-of-territories analysis is
more appealing in cases where both parent companies are entrants.
93 See generally Van Cise, "The Future of Per Se in Antitrust law," 50 Va. L.
Rev. 1165 (1964).
94 Id. at 1176. See generally Comment, "The joint Venture Meets Section 7 of
the Clayton Act: Technical Capability, Reasonable Probability and Business Reality,"
38 So. Cal. L. Rev. 104 (1965).
95 See Rahl, supra note 83, at 132-38.
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joint venture, and (2) that even though the existence of the joint
venture will increase competition within the relevant market, such
increase is likely to be substantially less than would have been
created had both parent companies entered the market or had one
company entered while the other remained on the edge of the mar-
ket threatening to enter." As to the second requirement, the evi-
dence must be projected into the future to determine the probable
injury to potential competition. Regarding the requirement of proof,
both of the recent potential competition cases, El Paso and Penn-
Olin, were strong on the facts. The prior agreements and relations
between the parent companies, the rapidly expanding markets, the
readily identifiable potential competitors, the eagerness of the poten-
tial competitors to enter the markets, and the size of the parents
and their probable impact on the relevant markets were important
factors well sustained by the evidence in each case. One can see,
then, that precise economic conditions in the relevant market and
the relative position of the parties to that market and to each other
are of prime significance. Unless conditions substantially similar to
those in El Paso and Penn-Olin are present it is likely for the present
that the courts will consider any injury to potential competition a
"mere possibility." 97
Merger Policy and Joint Ventures
Because joint ventures can result in the same anticompetitive
effects as mergers, it is reasonable to rely on the recent merger cases
as guides in attempting to determine the legality of joint ventures.
This is not to say that joint ventures should be treated exactly like
mergers, for the inherent usefulness of joint ventures for bona fide
endeavors warrants further consideration of other criteria that may
tend to justify joint ventures under certain conditions where merg-
ers would be condemned. Nevertheless, the criteria of the merger
cases are at least relevant in joint venture cases in determining the
degree of anticompetitive effect required to establish a prima facie
violation. As an indication that the Government is not attempting
to apply merger principles to joint ventures without qualification,
it has been stated that the Government is not interested in prohibit-
ing joint ventures between small companies.98 However, whether
this is true merely because of a lack of governmental facilities to
warrant interest in small joint ventures, or whether the Government
is conceding that joint ventures between relatively small companies
91 Comment, supra note 94, at 111.
97 See United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, supra note 89, at 856.
I's Dixon, "Joint Ventures: What Is Their Impact on Competition ?" 7 Antitrust
Bull. 397, 406 (1962).
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do not substantially lessen actual or potential competition is open
to question.
It is realistic to assume that merger policy as announced in
recent Supreme Court decisions will eventually be applied to joint
ventures, at least where one of the partners involved is among the
leaders in the particular industry. Since section 7 is concerned with
probabilities and tendencies towards concentration, it is likely that
the courts will carefully examine the relevant market shares of the
partners and the reduction of market shares of the existing com-
petitors resulting from the joint venture. The courts will undoubt-
edly note the degree of concentration in the relevant market. Fol-
lowing the rule of United States v. Alwminum Co. of America 9 a
minimal increase in market share of a dominating corporate-parent
could be condemned where the history of the industry is one of
concentration. Also, where one joint venture, though minimal in
size, could perpetuate an existing trend of concentration in the
industry by encouraging other joint ventures, the joint venture
could be struck down.'00 Under the rule of Philadelpkia Bank a
presumption of illegality could be invoked if one or both parent-
corporations are relatively large.'"- Therefore, since the anticompeti-
tive consequences of mergers and joint ventures are similar, the
current interpretation of section 7 found in the merger cases prob-
ably will apply with equal force to joint ventures in determining
prima facie illegality. Moreover, it is likely that the concept of
potential competition will gain new impetus in all antitrust cases
as a result of future joint venture litigation. The overall result will
be an expansion of the sphere of competition subject to elimination,
and thus a widening of the coverage of the antitrust laws.0 2
It is evident that were the Government compelled to rely solely
on the Sherman Act, many joint ventures would flourish before
their adverse effects could be remedied. This contention is exem-
99 377 U.S. 271 (1964) [Alcoa-Rome Cable]. In that case, Alcoa acquired Rome
Cable Corp., thereby adding 1.3% to Alcoa's share of the aluminum conductor market
The Supreme Court held that, given the oligopolistic framework of the industry, the
acquisition would result in a substantial lessening of competition. Alcoa's monopoly of
the industry was successfully attacked in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), but the deconcentration in the industry since that time
had occurred as a result of governmental intervention and not from normal com-
petitive action.
100 Cf. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
-10 Cf. Continental Can Co. v. United States, 378 U.S. 441 (1964) ; United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). In the Philadelphia Bank case the
merger in question resulted in an increase of 30% in market share for the respondent
bank. The Court held that large mergers in this degree are inherently suspect, creat-
ing a rebuttable presumption of illegality.
102 See Rahl, supra note 83, at 131-32.
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plified by the fact that in Penn-Olin the Court found no violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act because of the lack of proof of
intent to use Penn-Olin as a device to eliminate competition. 10 3
However, the quality and quantity of proof required to find a
Sherman Act violation is now subject to re-examination in light of
United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington.0 4
That case suggests that there is very little difference in the tests of
illegality under the Sherman Act and section 7. The merger between
the First National Bank and the Security Trust Co. of Lexington
resulted in the control of 79.62% of the trust accounts in the Lex-
ington area. In holding that the merger violated the Sherman Act,
Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, relied heavily on
the testimony of competitive banks that the respondent's size in
the trust area would tend to foreclose competition over the years
among the various banks.10 5 As the dissenters pointed out, the ma-
jority ignored the economic factor involved in the consolidation and
based its decision on "bigness." 106 The test thus evolved and used
was strikingly similar to the test applied in Philadelphia Bank
under section 7. If the approach taken by the Court in Lexington
Bank becomes established, the Government, in joint venture cases
involving large, industry-dominating companies, will be able to
prove violations of the Sherman Act with the same relative ease that
characterizes section 7 cases. 10 7 This result would be important in
cases where injury to potential competition could not be established,
but other forms of injury to competition or restraints of trade could
be shown. However, should the views of Mr. Justice Douglas pre-
vail, it appears that the Court would eventually find per se viola-
tions of both section 7 and the Sherman Act based on agreements
between the corporate partners to divide territories and not to
compete with each other. At least the holding in Lexington Bank
103 378 U.S. at 176. It is not the proof of intent to restrain trade that hinders the
finding of Sherman Act violations, but the requirement of proof of actual anticompeti-
tive effects. The intent to restrain trade is often presumed. See United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1945). The court in Spears Free Clinic & Hosp. v.
Cleere, 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952), held that specific intent to restrain trade or to
create monopoly need not be shown, rather it is sufficient if a restraint or monopoly
results in consequence of defendant's conduct.
104 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
105 Id. at 669. The district court had characterized this testimony as "based
merely upon surmise and... lacking in factual support." United States v. First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 208 F. Supp. 457, 460 (E.D. Ky. 1964).
106 376 U.S. at 680 (dissenting opinion).
107 My suggestion is, of course, that had the Penn-Olin Court followed the theory
of proof of Lexington Bank-a presumption of illegality based on size-the Govern-
ment might have prevailed in Penn-Olin on its charge of Sherman Act violations.
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and Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in Penn-Olin, when read together,
suggest this possibility.
CONCLUSION
The real significance of Penn-Olin is its use of potential com-
petition as a substitute for actual competition, i.e., the vision of
potential competition as an existing competitive force, the elimina-
tion of which is an antitrust violation. Potential competition in
this sense must be distinguished from the concept of potential com-
petition as an element of market analysis. In the latter sense, the
concept is not itself an ultimate theory of violation, but is used to
describe a condition of freedom of entry into the relevant market. 08
Therefore, potential competition in this sense is only another factor
in determining the probable consequences of a merger with respect
to actual competition in the industry. On the other hand, potential
competition as used in Penn-Olin and El Paso, when coupled with
the incipiency theory, focuses section 7 on the probable injury to
potential competition,10 9 thus adding a second inference to the
incipiency theory. This removes still further from reality the injury
sought to be enjoined.
In broadening the coverage of section 7 to include joint ven-
tures and potential competition, the Court in Penn-Olin and El
Paso has perpetuated the trend of liberal statutory interpretation
designed to effectuate the national policy of deconcentration. This
trend is also exemplified by such recent decisions as Brown Shoe,
the Alcoa-Rome Cable case, Philadelphia Bank, and the Lexington
Bank case. These recent decisions are characterized by the great
weight given to congressional intent and general national policy
and by a general lack of credible precedent.'" It is also apparent
that the Supreme Court's more liberal element, headed by Mr.
Justice Douglas, has launched an all-out attack on bigness per se,
as exemplified by Philadelphia Bank's rebuttable presumption, Lex-
ington Bank's Clayton-like approach to a Sherman case, and Alcoa-
Rome Cable's promotion of the tendency and relevant-market-
history approach.
Assuming that the current trend of statutory interpretation
continues, the bigness-is-bad concept will, in all probability, even-
tually apply with equal force to joint ventures. Thus it is possible
that many joint ventures which might promote competition could
108 Rahl, supra note 83, at 132-35.
109 Day, "Conglomerate Mergers and 'The Curse of Bigness'," 42 N.C.L. Rev.
511, 534 (1964).
110 See United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, supra note
104, at 673 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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be struck down. Even small joint ventures could be invalidated
where the industry is leaning toward oligopoly and the resulting
elimination of potential competition tends to promote that trend.
Also, the social benefits of new markets, new products, and increased
business efficiency could be increasingly outweighed by the Court's
deepening-of-the-pockets or bigness-is-bad logic. It is submitted that
unqualified application of merger policy to joint ventures would
work to the detriment of the public welfare. Therefore, in determin-
ing the legality of joint ventures, it is hoped that the Supreme Court
goes no further than the test of the Penn-Olin case, keeping in mind
the inherent advantages of joint ventures in promoting workable
competition.
Patrick J. Smith,
